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ARGUMENT
A careful reading of the plaintiff's brief and the
defendant's brief show that there are numerous disputes regarding
the interpretation of cases and the law. Most of the issues
raised by the defendants, were addressed in the plaintiff's
opening brief.

Thus, in the interest of brevity, this brief will

not readdress every issue raised by the defendant's brief.
I.

THIS COURT SHOULD HOLD THIS EXCULPATORY AGREEMENT INVALID AS
A MATTER OF LAW.
In its brief, the plaintiff asserted that the majority of

states have held that exculpatory agreements are enforceable, but
are subject to close scrutiny.

The plaintiff also asserted that

a minority of courts have held that exculpatory clauses are
invalid as a matter of law.
On pages 9 and 10 of its brief, and without any citation to
authority, the defendant claims that no minority rule exists.
Instead, all states, and the federal government, adhere to the
majority rule.

The commentators, and courts do not support such

a proposition.

Williston on Contracts states,

"contracts enabling one to exculpate himself from
liability for negligence or some other tort in which he
has participated or will participate are at least
strictly scrutinized and may well not be enforceable,
though modern courts often view not only the
exculpatory nature of such an agreement, but also the
subject matter of the agreement, the nature of the
conduct involved, and other factors, including the
public or private nature of the endeavor and the
1

specificity of the language used, and whether it
specifically mentions such words as "negligence,"
before declaring a particular agreement valid or
invalid."
Richard A. Lord, Williston on Contracts §12:2 (4th Ed. 1993).
The tenth circuit has stated:
11

[m]uch has been said concerning the enforceability of
so-called release-from-negligence contracts whereby one
possessed of superior bargaining power is enabled to
contract against liability for his own negligence. The
federal view is that they are contrary to public
policy, especially contracts affected with a public
interest and involving the performance of a public
duty.[citations omitted]. The general rule, however,
seems to be that while private contracts of this type
are not favorites of the law, they are enforceable
provided they are made at arm's length without
disparity of bargaining power, and the intent of the
parties is manifestly plain and unequivocal, [citations
omitted]."
Titan Steel Corp. v. Walton, 365 F.2d 542 (10th Cir. 1966).
42 C.J.S., Indemnity §8, states:
"Agreements relieving one from one's own negligence are
ordinarily contrary to public policy and invalid.
Under other authority, it is not contrary to public
policy for a party to contract for indemnification
against its own negligence, particularly where the
indemnity agreement does not defeat plaintiff's
recovery...."
Finally, the Utah Supreme Court has stated:
"such covenants are sometimes declared invalid as being
against public policy. However, this may depend upon
the circumstances. The majority rule appears to be
that in most situations, where such is the desire of
the parties, and it is clearly understood and
expressed, such a covenant will be upheld."
Union Pacific Co. v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 17 Utah.2d 255,
259, 408 P.2d 910, 913-14 (1965).
2

Because Utah courts have never dealt with exculpatory
agreements involving personal injuries, this case is a case of
first impression in Utah.

The plaintiff contends that this court

should hold that such agreements are violative of public policy,
and thus invalid as a matter of law.

In the alternative, the

plaintiff asks this court to hold that the exculpatory clause is
not clear and unequivocal, and is thus unenforceable.
II.

UTAH LAW REQUIRES EXCULPATORY CLAUSES TO BE STRICTLY
CONSTRUED.
Utah law has long held that agreements that seek to relieve

one's liability for his negligent acts are disfavored.

Union

Pacific R.R. Co. v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 408 P.2d 910, 913
(Utah 1965).

According to the weight of authority, such

agreements should be strictly construed.

Freund v. Utah Power &

Light Co., 793 P.2d 362, 370 (Utah 1990).

Accordingly, a party

can only shift the responsibility of paying for his own
negligence to another when "that intention is 'clearly and
unequivocally expressed.'"
914).

Id. at 370 (quoting Union Pacific at

In the instant case, Respondent is using an exculpatory

clause in the agreement to escape liability for negligence.

The

contract should be construed strictly against Respondent, and the
court should limit its reading of the contract to the express
meaning of the document.

3

III. FOR A RELEASE-FROM-NEGLIGENCE AGREEMENT TO BE VALID,
NEGLIGENCE MUST BE EXPRESSLY STATED IN THE CONTRACT.
When it is the desire of the parties to shield one of them
from liability for their own negligence, the parties can agree to
such a provision.

Union Pacific at 914. However, to do so, the

agreement must clearly express such an intention, without relying
on "inference or implication from general language" in the
contract.

Id. at 914.

In Union Pacific, a railroad company

granted an easement along its railway to a gas company.
company was to lay a pipeline parallel to the track.

The gas

In their

contract, the railroad wanted an exculpatory clause releasing it
from any liability for harm to the gas company's employees.

The

language used in the agreement required the gas company to hold
the railroad harmless:

"from and against any and all liability,

loss, damage, claims . . . of whatsoever nature, . . . growing
out of injury or harm to or death of persons . . . howsoever
caused."

Id. at 912.

In holding this language insufficient to

exculpate the railroad from injury caused to a gas company
employee, the court said:
"if it had been the intent of the parties that the
defendant should indemnify the plaintiff even against
the latter's negligent acts, it would have been easy
enough to use that very language and to thus make that
intent clear and unmistakable, which was not done
here."
Id. at 914.

4

Because the word "negligent" was not expressly used, the strict
construction of the agreement demanded that negligence was not
meant to be included.
In the instant case, Respondent likewise seeks to avoid
liability because of an exculpatory clause.

In the clause,

Respondent sought to insulate itself from a wide base of
liability and used very general language in doing so.

The

agreement does not refer to negligence expressly, but instead
asks Russ to hold it harmless against "any and all claims,
damages, loss and expenses."

Exhibit A to this Brief.

Because

the law requires this agreement to be strictly construed in favor
of Russ, the overly broad language should make the agreement
invalid.

Respondent's intention to insulate itself from its

negligent conduct is not expressly and clearly stated in the
agreement, making it void for vagueness.
IV.

THE TREND LIMITING STRICT CONSTRUCTION APPLIES ONLY TO
COMMERCIAL LEASES.
A.

The Russ/Woodside agreement was in a non-commercial

context.
Respondent argues that according to Freund, there is a trend
to diminish the use of the strict construction rule in
exculpatory clauses.

Brief of Respondent at 6.

Quoting Freund,

they urge that an exculpating agreement no longer needs to refer
specifically to negligence if the "language and the purposes of
5

the entire agreement" clearly imply an intention to indemnify.
Brief of Respondent at 6.
commercial context.

However, Freund only applies in a

Relying on Niagara Frontier Transportation

Authority v. Tri-Delta Constr. Corp., 487 N.Y.S.2d 428, 430
(1985), the Freund court held that the trend to relax the strict
construction of these clauses applies when such agreements have
been "negotiated at armfs length between . . . sophisticated
business entities."

Freund at 370.

Respondent urges that the transaction between the Russes and
Respondent falls within the rule in Freund, but fails to justify
their conclusion that the Russes were a sophisticated commercial
party.

Brief of Respondent at 8.

Resolving all inferences from

admitted facts in favor of the party opposing summary judgment,
Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 158-159 (1970), the
Russes must be viewed as a non-commercial party, making Freund
inapplicable.

They were two private consumers buying a home from

a large development company.

Their contract with Respondent was

to have a home, not a business, built and they paid up front for
it (arguably an unsophisticated financial move).

Their non-

commercial status is buttressed by the fact that the contract was
signed in their own names, and not by or in behalf of a business
entity.

Since they do not meet the commercial status spoken of

in Freund, the rule of strictly construing exculpatory
agreements, as stated in Freund and Union Pacific, applies.

6

Respondent further argues that aside from Freund, Utah law
enforces releases between private and commercial parties. Brief
of Respondent at 8.

They rely on Berube v. Fashion Centre, 771

P.2d 1033 (Utah 1989).

In Berube, an employee signed an

agreement which released the employer from all claims and causes
of action relating to a polygraph examination.

Id. at 1039.

While holding the contract valid as a matter of law, the court
said that

fl

[w]e do not hold that plaintiff could not have raised

legitimate claims challenging the release, [citation indicating
unconscionable contracts are unenforceable omitted] . . . In this
case, however, plaintiff does not challenge defendant's reliance
upon the express terms of the release."

Id. at 1040.

Thus, the

court did not hold that exculpatory agreements are valid between
private and commercial parties based on the merits, but rather,
held that the reason for the holding was plaintiff's failure to
challenge the release.
B

-

Even if the Freund test applies in non-commercial

contexts, the Russ/Woodside exculpatory agreement is void.
Assuming, arguendo, that the Freund holding applies in noncommercial contexts, the exculpatory clause in this case is still
void.

In Freund, that court held that an exculpatory agreement

that did not mention negligence was still valid because the
intent to do so was clearly implied from the surrounding
circumstances.

It gave four factors in its holding: (1) "the
7

breadth of the language employed/" (2) the extensive use of the
word "liabilities" in the clause, (3) the contrast of the clause
against exceptions to the clause in anther paragraph of the
contract, and (4) the statement that "full and complete"
indemnification is present.

These factors are distinguishable

from the case at bar.
Petitioner concedes that the first factor elucidated in
Freund is common to the Russ/Woodside agreement.

Both agreements

state that the indemnification covers "all and any claims" that
may arise.

Exhibit A to this brief.

While this factor seems to

cut against Respondent, since the broad language violates the
strict construction rule and makes the boundaries of the
agreement ambiguous, nonetheless, it is met.
The use of the word "liabilities" was the next factor.

The

court seemed to say that using the word would make the clauses
intent to cover negligence more clear.

In the Russ/Woodside

agreement, the word "liability" is never used.

Exhibit A to this

brief.
The most distinguishable factor is number three.

In the

Freund agreement, the sentence after the exculpatory clause
outlines the limit of the clause's scope.

It says that there

will be no indemnification for intentional conduct or willful
negligence.

Freund at 371. By exclusion, the inference is that

negligence will be covered.

This specific language puts the

8

reader on notice of what kind of conduct is covered.

Without it,

the reader is left to guess whether intentional conduct/gross
negligence is meant to be covered or not.

The Russ/Woodside

agreement is void of any language of this kind.

No other part of

the agreement gives clarity to the exculpatory clause, which
seeks to indemnify for all conduct that the law will allow.
Exhibit A to this brief.

That it refers to the "fullest extent

permitted by law," Exhibit A to this brief, lends no clarity
because the fullest extent of the law will depend on whether such
agreements are valid.

The reasoning is circular.

The last factor is the use of the terms "full and complete"
indemnification.

This is meant to clarify the extent to which

the party will be indemnified.

Such language is again absent

from the Russ/Woodside agreement.

No other language contained in

the clause clarifies the extent of exculpation.

Since three of

Freund1s factors in finding clarity in its exculpatory agreement
are distinguishable from the Russ/Woodside agreement, Freund does
not control the present case, even assuming it applies to noncommercial agreements.
V.

PUBLIC POLICY DISFAVORS EXCULPATORY CLAUSES.
Respondent argues that public policy does not support

holding exculpatory clauses invalid.

However, courts have been

willing to strike down exculpatory clauses based on public
policy.

In Bisso v. Inland Waterways Corp., 349 U.S. 85 (1955),
9

the owner of a towboat contracted to pull a barge up the
Mississippi River.

The contract specified that the towage was

the sole risk of the barge owner.

Id. at 86.

the barge crashed into a pier and sank.

During the tow,

Id. at 86.

The barge

owner sued for negligence, but the tower rested upon an
exculpatory clause, claiming to be relieved from all liability.
After holding that exculpatory clauses among towers are invalid,
the court went on to say:
This rule is merely a particular application to the towage
business of a general rule long used by courts and
legislatures to prevent enforcement from release-fromnegligence contracts in many relationships such as bailors
and bailees, employers and employees, public service
companies and their customers. The two main reasons for the
creation and application of the rule have been (1) to
discourage negligence by making wrongdoers pay damages, and
(2) to protect those in need of goods or services from being
overreached by others who have power to drive hard bargains.
Id. at 90-91.
While this was dicta, it specified a policy-based analysis for
striking down exculpatory agreements.

The public interest in

making wrongdoers pay damages, and thereby encouraging more care
in their conduct toward others, was also urged in Union Pacific.
In supporting the strict construction rule, the court said that
to do otherwise "would tend to encourage carelessness."

Union

Pacific at 913.
On pages 11-13 of its brief, the defendant states that a
construction company is not a public servant and thus the public
policy arguments do not apply.

Plaintiff objects to this

10

argument on several grounds.

First, the lists propounded by

Tunkl and Krohnert are not exhaustive and should not be strictly
adopted by this court.

Instead, this court should consider those

factors, and others, in determining the validity of an
exculpatory contract.

Second, general contractors are public

servants and thus exculpatory clauses in construction contracts
should be declared invalid as a matter of law.

"Although under

some authority, indemnity provisions in construction contracts
are valid, under other authority, a construction contract which
contains a clause which indemnifies or holds harmless another
person for that other person's own negligence is against public
policy and void."

42 C.J.S., Indemnity §8(b).

Respondent intimates that the true public policy behind
exculpatory clauses is to allow parties to allocate risk among
themselves and their insurers.

See, Brief of Respondent at 18.

However, the exculpatory clause in this case made no mention of
insurers.

Reading the clause as it is written, it mentions

nothing about reallocating the risk to another person.
it simply strips Respondent of any responsibility.

Instead,

If the

injured party has no insurance, they recover nothing.

Thus, the

policy of simply allocating the financial loss to a third party
is not applicable here.

11

VI.

THE BURDEN OF PROOF ARGUMENT WAS PROPERLY RAISED BY THE

PLAINTIFF
The defendant contends that the plaintiff did not properly
raise the burden of proof argument in the lower court and is thus
barred from raising that issue on appeal.

That contention cannot

be supported by reference to the trial court record.
On page 4 of its memorandum in opposition to the defendant's
motion for summary judgement, the plaintiff quoted from Union
Pac. R.R. v. El Paso Nat. Gas Co., 17 Utah.2d 255, 408 P.2d 910,
914 (1965).

The quote reads, "the presumption is against any

such intention . . . . It will be regarded as a binding
contractual obligation only when that intention is clearly and
unequivocally expressed." id. at 914.
Additionally, the plaintiff briefed the lower court
extensively on the issue of whether Mrs. Russ understood the
exculpatory provision.

Page 12 of the plaintiff's opposing

memorandum states that Mr. Russ did not understand the
defendant's interpretation of the contract term until the motion
for summary judgement was filed.

The plaintiff went on to

explain that the contract terms were relegated to the middle of
the contract and were not printed so as to draw attention to it.
The plaintiff argued that this evidence showed that it is
doubtful that Mrs. Russ understood the contractual provision.
The intent of the parties was also raised on page 9 of the
12

opposing memorandum.

Finally, on page 13 of the opposing

memorandum, the plaintiff stated, "this court should take all of
the facts and inferences in the light most favorable to Mr.
Russ."
Thus, the burden of proof argument was called to the
attention of the trial court.
Assuming, arguendo, that the burden of proof argument was
not properly raised before the trial court, the defendant cannot
now claim that it did not bear the burden of proof below.

"Where

a party has assumed the burden of proving a fact, he will not be
heard to say for the first time on appeal that the burden of
proof was on the other party."

4 C.J.S., Appeal & Error §241(f).

In the defendant's memorandum in support of its motion for
summary judgment, the defendant raised the issue of the
decedentf s intent and argued that the decedent had intended to
exculpate the defendant. Memorandum in Support of Motion for
Summary Judgment, pages 2.

By raising that argument, the

plaintiff assumed that it bore the burden of proof in showing
that the decedent agreed to the agreement.

That assumption was

made by both parties in the subsequent pleadings.

Therefore, the

defendant cannot now argue that it did not bear the burden of
proof on this matter.

13

CONCLUSION
The contract provision invoked by the defendant attempts to
exculpate the defendant from any responsibility for injury
resulting to the plaintiff and his deceased wife for the
defendant's negligence in maintaining the safety of a
construction site.

Because the contractual provision is

exculpatory in nature, it is highly disfavored by the law.
The public policy concerns, indicate that this court should
hold that exculpatory clauses in construction contracts are
invalid as a matter of law. Additionally, the language of this
particular exculpatory clause is vague and ambiguous.

Finally,

the defendant has not carried its burden of proof because it has
failed to show that the decedent agreed to the exculpatory
provision.
For the above reasons, Charles Russ respectfully requests
this Court to reverse the trial court's decision to grant summary
judgment in Respondent's favor.

DATED this 21st day of April, 1995
Abbott & Abbott
Attorneys at Law

by Nelson Abbott
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